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Abstract
Although scholars are increasingly able to explain why states (do not) comply with human rights treaties, the role of social
norms in compliance has been neglected. This is remarkable because human rights often directly address social norms. Our
study aims to contribute to the existing literature by providing quantitative and qualitative evidence on the relationship
between citizens’ social norms and compliance with human rights treaties. The quantitative results provide strong support
for such a relationship. The findings from the additional qualitative analysis suggest that bargaining over (and thus chang-
ing) social norms is an important process through which compliance with human rights can be influenced.
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1. Introduction
The implementation of human rights treaties is a criti-
cal aim of some states and many international organiza-
tions. However, the ratification of a human rights treaty
is not enough to ensure its effectiveness. Despite exten-
sive scholarly attention, the explanation for the large va-
riety in states’ human rights practices remains unsatis-
factory. Concepts such as decoupling clarify why a state
ratifies human rights treaties, but fail to explain the dif-
ferent and changing levels of compliance. Scholars are
therefore increasingly focusing on domestic institutions
to explain states’ human rights practices.
This article is built on the proposition that the do-
mestic turn in human rights studies is pivotal for a bet-
ter understanding of the variations in compliance we see
across the world. We argue, however, that this turn has
neglected the vital role of informal institutions in shap-
ing states’ behavior (Cortell & Davis, 2000; Fraser, 2019;
Harris-Short, 2003; Zwart, 2012; Zwingel, 2012). We hy-
pothesize that populations resist the implementation of
human rights when their provisions do not match social
norms, and are supportive of implementation when pro-
visions do match norms. A match could then increase
the effectiveness of human rights treaties. Importantly,
this hypothesis suggests that citizens themselves have
an important role to play in both the protection and
violation of their own rights. Our study aims to con-
tribute to the existing literature by providing quantitative
and qualitative evidence concerning the relationship be-
tween citizens’ social norms and compliancewith human
rights treaties.
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The following question guides the research: What
is the role of populations’ social norms in state compli-
ancewith human rights treaties?We focus specifically on
Article 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which cov-
ers women’s active and passive voting rights. We apply
a mixed-methods design that includes a quantitative em-
pirical test on the association between social norms and
state compliance. The additional qualitative approach en-
forces our understanding of which processes might drive
the observed relationship. A country-by-year data set
was created from several international data sources cov-
ering seventy-four countries. The complementary quali-
tative case study focuses on the Netherlands, a country
characterized by a high level of compliance and progres-
sive norms. Looking in greater depth at this case gives
insights into how processes of social norm change can
support compliance.
2. Theoretical Background
Already twenty years ago, Andrew Cortell and James
Davis urged for further research on populations’ tradi-
tions and preferences, as these could potentially explain
cross-national variation in compliance (Cortell & Davis,
2000, pp. 66–67). They argued that a convention would
automatically have the status of a national norm, when
there is a cultural match between the international con-
vention and domestic traditions. This could also possibly
increase the level of compliance. Conversely, in case of
a mismatch, the population would consider the treaty
to be inconsistent with their own values, traditions, or
aspirations. The promotion of such an international con-
vention might then lead to domestic resistance and its
rejection (Bloomfield, 2015; Cortell & Davis, 2000). In
this case, a state might provide all the legal guarantees
that an international treaty requires, but conflicting do-
mestic traditions and practices could still hinder their
effective use (Fraser, 2019; Merry, 2009; Welzel, 2002;
Zwingel, 2012). Similarly, in her valuable study, Sonia
Harris-Short (2003, p. 134) suggests that in many cases
“the state finds itself unable to realize [its human rights
commitment] in practice, because of the absence of a hu-
man rights culture at the local level.” She argues that the
problem of non-compliance cannot always be blamed on
state elites who are unwilling to comply. On the contrary,
even if there is political will to comply with human rights,
the reality on the ground can make compliance difficult.
Nine years after Harris-Short’s study, Tom Zwart (2012,
p. 561) again emphasized the importance of consider-
ing local practices for understanding the implementation
of human rights. He states that human rights implemen-
tations “that add to the existing [local] arrangements
stand a far better chance of being supported and carried
out by the community than those that are enforced top-
down.” Julie Fraser (2019, p. 977) further elaborates on
this point, by arguing that in many situations, social insti-
tutions “can be more potent than legislation” in improv-
ing human rights implementation. She advocates using
more culturally sensitive approaches to implement hu-
man rights, bymaking active use of and building on social
institutions (Fraser, 2019, p. 977).
Yet, despite this elaborate attention, the discussion
on the role of norms remains unsettled. Zwart (2012)
and Ibhawoh (2000), despite providing pivotal insights
on the role of local practices, present limited empirical
evidence. In fact, both quantitative and qualitative schol-
ars campaign for more empirical analysis that legal re-
search cannot provide. Harris-Short (2003) and Fraser
(2019) both present relevant and interesting empirical
evidence in their case studies, thereby demonstrating
the need for more empirical evidence beyond their sin-
gle cases. Moreover, Harris-Short’s study highlights the
need for more empirical data on social norms, as her
evidence is based on documents created by state elites.
As she herself acknowledges, governments might not be
the most reliable interpreters of a population’s cultural
values (Harris-Short, 2003). Thus, although valuable, her
study lacks the type of evidence that only data collected
at the level of citizens can provide. In this article, we
make an attempt to provide such evidence by presenting
cross-country quantitative survey data that test the as-
sociation between social norms and compliance, as well
as qualitative evidence from a case study that demon-
strates how changing social norms can drive compliance.
2.1. Social Norms
The limited evidence is partly related to a disagreement
onwhat social norms are. It appears that scholars provid-
ing empirical evidence do not study norms within pop-
ulations directly. Instead, they focus on, for instance,
domestic policies (Simmons, 2009), constituencies (Dai,
2005), or local redefinitions of international conventions
(Acharya, 2004; An-Na’im, 2000; Merry, 2009; Zwingel,
2012). Other analyses do not clearly distinguish between
populations’ social norms, i.e., informal institutions guid-
ing people’s interactions, and national formal rules, such
as laws, i.e., formal institutions (Flowers, 2009).
Drawing on insights from new institutionalism, this
article aims to advance the existing knowledge of social
norms and human rights compliance by providing empiri-
cal evidence that is based on a clear definition and opera-
tionalization of social norms within populations. We con-
sider institutions, both formal and informal, to present a
web of interrelated norms or rules that govern social re-
lationships. It is through facilitating and/or constraining
that these institutions give shape to larger unit perfor-
mance, such as families, work environments, and even
entire economies (Gërxhani, 2004, p. 732; Nee & Ingram,
1998, p. 19). Formal institutions are explicit rules, such
as laws, which rely on formal monitoring mechanisms
from authorities such as the state. In contrast, informal
institutions, i.e., social norms, are the informal rules of a
group or community. Shared understandings of a social
group or community on gender (in-)equality are cases in
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point. These norms are not necessarily explicitly stated,
and rely on informal mechanisms of monitoring, such as
social (dis)approval (Nee & Ingram, 1998, p. 19).
New institutionalist research has shown that study-
ing the relationship between social norms and formal
rules is pivotal in understanding political (Helmke &
Levitsky, 2004), economic (Gërxhani, 2004), and legal
outcomes (Moon & Hein, 2013). Since human rights
treaties are formal rules, insights from new institution-
alism can also be relevant to further understanding the
relationship between social norms and compliance with
these treaties. The literature recognizes four types of
interactions between formal and informal institutions
(Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). The first is complementarity,
in which informal rules or social norms coexist with ef-
fective formal institutions. In such an interaction, social
norms play a crucial complementary role in making the
formal rules effective, ensuring that they are not only
rules on paper. One example is the U.S. Constitution. Its
effectiveness is often linked to a complementary set of
shared beliefs and expectations among citizens (Helmke
& Levitsky, 2004, p. 728). The second type of interaction
is accommodation, in which social norms provide incen-
tives that support a different type of behaviour than the
formal institutions do. Yet, as the formal institutions are
effective, the informal norms simply accommodate them
by providing alternatives and do not constitute a direct
challenge to the formal rules. One classic example re-
gards the former communist countries where the strictly
enforced formal rules were accommodated by informal
arrangements of goods provision. The third type of inter-
action is competition, in which formal rules are weakly
enforced and typically not adhered to. In this case, social
norms can become dominant and offer a competing role
to formal rules in shaping behaviour. Such an interaction
is observed in southern Italy where norms enforced by
the Mafia are dominant. Finally, the fourth type of inter-
action is substitution. Here, the formal institutions are
weakly enforced as well. However, social norms take a
substituting role by establishing expectations and guid-
ing behavior in the sameway the weak formal rules were
designed to do (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 729).
The latter case, in which the interaction between for-
mal rules and social norms is substitutive, is particularly
interesting when it comes to human rights. Human rights
enforcement mechanisms are generally considered as
lacking teeth; states are not routinely or consistently
held accountable for ongoing violations (Hafner-Burton
& Tsutui, 2005, 2007; Lebovic & Voeten, 2009, p. 79).
We argue that individuals and communities can succeed
in substituting weakly enforced formal human rights
through their ability to enforce these rights informally,
and subsequently change social norms. Informal norms
within societies are never static. They often differ among
communities within one society, and are subject to con-
stant struggle and change (Donnelly, 2007). We apply
the so-called bargaining approachwithin new institution-
alism to explain whether and how such change of so-
cial norms in communities happens. This approach is
important as it provides a possible explanation of how
negotiating over (and thus changing) social norms af-
fects state compliance with international conventions.
Moreover, it responds to earlier calls to focusmore on so-
cial norms, as well as using amore actor-based approach
to understand human rights compliance (Fraser, 2019;
Nyamu-Musembi, 2002). As Celestine Nyamu-Musembi
(2002, p. 1) argues, “rights are shaped through actual
struggles informed by people’s own understanding of
what they are justly entitled to.”
The bargaining approach outlines how those with
the most bargaining power are most likely to see their
preferred norm established as a common norm in their
community (Knight & Ensminger, 1998). The basis of this
bargaining power can be material, such as financial re-
sources, or non-material, such as ideology and status. An
important element of bargaining power is access to or
control over formal and informal enforcement mecha-
nisms. This is because even when a new norm is intro-
duced and shared within a population, it is essential that
the initiators of norm change establish and use effective
sanctioning mechanisms. Otherwise, the new normmay
not be adhered to, and people can return to their old
practices (Knight & Ensminger, 1998, p. 120).
In conclusion, by drawing on insights from new in-
stitutionalism this study will quantitatively test the rela-
tionship between social norms and compliance based on
the following proposition: The higher the percentage of
people adhering to social norms that contradict the con-
tent of a human rights treaty, the lower will be the level
of compliance with that treaty. However, such a quanti-
tative relationship does not say anything about the un-
derlying process driving the association between social
norms and compliance with a treaty. We therefore use
qualitative methods to shed more light on this process
and to better interpret the findings in the framework of
the bargaining approach within new institutionalism.
3. Study Design, Data, and Methods
Our empirical focus is on the CEDAW. This choice is mo-
tivated by our main interest in exploring the relation-
ship between social norms and compliance. Women’s
rights are often deeply rooted in local cultures. Even
governments that genuinely want to improve women’s
rights are expected to see their goals obstructed by so-
cial norms regarding women (Ibhawoh, 2000, p. 848;
Merry, 2009; Simmons, 2009, p. 203). We thus expect
the impact of social norms on compliance to be the
strongest for this treaty. In other words, if we find no
relationship between social norms and compliance with
the contested CEDAW, it may even be less likely to find
it for more consensual treaties. This strategy is known
as choosing the most likely observation. The disadvan-
tage is that it is not the most rigorous test, because the
treaties for which the effect of norms is less likely, such
as the Convention Against Torture, have not been tested.
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Nonetheless, the findings may be worthy of further in-
vestigation, as the relationship will have survived a plau-
sibility probe (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).
We specifically narrow to one treaty article, namely
Article 7A, for two reasons. First, it is very difficult to
measure compliance with the CEDAW as a whole. The
treaty contains broad obligations that are difficult to de-
fine precisely. This is usually solved by focusing on the ba-
sic rights that are mentioned most explicitly in the treaty
(Hathaway, 2002; Simmons, 2009, p. 255). Article 7A,
which deals with political participation, is a case in point:
State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in the polit-
ical and public life of the country and, in particular,
shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the
right: (a) To vote in all elections and public referenda
and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected
bodies. (United Nations General Assembly, 1979)
The second reason to narrow to Article 7 is because
it is considered to be “a fundamental provision of the
Convention, the implementation of which is essential to
fulfilling its object and purpose” (Government of Finland,
1996) by many ratifying states. Nonetheless, we do not
aim to generalize our findings to the whole treaty as it is
possible that the relationship between social norms and
compliance is different for separate articles of the CEDAW.
As we do not provide empirical evidence for the other ar-
ticles, that could be a focus for future research to explore.
3.1. Quantitative Data and Methods
We created a data set of 123 country-year observations
covering 73 countries. Each country was assigned sev-
eral country-years when it had several measure points
over time. The number of country-years is determined by
data availability from the World Values Survey and from
the augmented macro-level data (see Section A for se-
lection of countries in the Supplementary Material). The
time period ranges from 1995 to 2008. There is a maxi-
mum of three measure points per country (1996, 2001,
and 2007). The sample creates an unbalanced panel, be-
cause not every country is measured in every survey
wave. Countries that have not ratified the CEDAW are ex-
cluded from the sample.
The dependent variable measures the effectiveness
of Article 7A through the percentage of seats in national
parliaments held by women. This indicator suffers from
the same issue as many compliance indicators, as there
is a misfit between our actual data and the precise re-
quirements of the treaty (Hathaway, 2002, p. 1968). Yet,
we believe this measure is appropriate, first, because it
is more specific than other indicators. For example, the
Gender Inequality Index is an often-used indicator, but it
is too broad for our purposes. It includes reproductive
health, percentage of parliamentary seats, and labour
market participation in one single indicator. Second, the
percentage of parliamentary seats is a highly reliable in-
dicator. It is measured in the sameway all over the world
and has no sampling errors or reporting bias. Finally, also
in other literature onwomen’s political participation, this
indicator is considered “strongly indicative of the success
of countries in putting in place practices and institutions
to achieve the requirements” (Hathaway, 2002, p. 1968).
The central independent variable is a measure of so-
cial norms regarding women in politics (“conservatism”).
For this variable, we use a statement from the World
Values Survey (threewaves, from1995 until 2007), which
directly measures norms (i.e., shared beliefs) regarding
women in political life: “On the whole, men make better
political leaders than women do” (Inglehart et al., 2014).
The original four-point scale was recoded such that a
respondent either agrees or disagrees with this state-
ment. The answers were then aggregated to percentages
at the country level. Thus, a higher score on “conser-
vatism” means a larger percentage of people per coun-
try agree that men make better political leaders than
women do. We are aware that such an aggregated mea-
sure of social norms, which is a highly complex andmulti-
faceted concept, is overly simplified. However, it does ac-
count for the critique that populations cannot be treated
as homogeneous groups with no internal differentiation
(Donnelly, 2007). Because it is measured in percentages,
the variable accounts for such differentiation and does
not treat the population as a homogeneous unit. We
also control for several variables which were selected
based on previous studies on compliance with human
rights (Cole, 2015; Hathaway, 2007; see Section B in the
Supplementary Material).
We apply a time lag of five years between the inde-
pendent variable (and controls) and the dependent vari-
able. We do so because if, at one point in time, social
norms are indeed related to the percentage of women in
national parliaments,we could expect to see someof that
influence in a following leadership change. When there
was no data available for the dependent variable in a spe-
cific year, data from the following or the previous year
was used. In some cases, it was necessary to expand this
to two years. For education, this was in some highly ex-
ceptional cases still not possible. Therefore, a maximum
of nine years following or previous to the year, for which
data was lacking, is used. Although nine years is a consid-
erable time span, it is not expected that the level of edu-
cation in a country will change significantly that quickly.
A multi-level regression analysis is used to explore
the relationship between social norms and state compli-
ance across countries controlling for changes over time.
We are also able to explore whether or not the rela-
tionship is consistent across countries. We run four dif-
ferent models (M1–M4) including variables in a step-
wise procedure. M1 is an empty model which examines
how much variation in compliance can be attributed to
between-country variation. M2 tests the impact of the
control variables, whereas M3 includes the social norm
measure as the main independent variable. M4 repli-
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cates M3 but additionally includes a random slope for
the social norm measure in order to see whether the re-
lationship between social norms and compliance varies
across countries.
3.2. Qualitative Data and Methods
For the qualitative analysis, we looked for a countrywhere
social norms support compliance, as this enables a study
of the underlying process. Based on an explorative anal-
ysis of one wave of the World Value Survey augmented
with data of theWorld Bank, we identified a group of four
countries with a large fraction of female representatives
and a low percentage of respondents agreeing that men
are better political leaders than women. This group con-
sists of Sweden,Norway, Finlandand theNetherlands (see
Section A in the Supplementary Material).
From this group, we selected the Netherlands, first
because of its reputation for being a progressive coun-
try with extensive women’s rights and emancipation
(Boerefijn & Goldschmidt, 2007). Second, and equally
important, the Dutch parliament houses a party called
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP; Reformed Party),
which persistently excluded women from party member-
ship and electable positions. This led to repeated critique
by the CEDAW Committee, which concluded that the
Netherlands was in violation of the treaty. Nevertheless,
the Dutch Government refused to interfere in the party’s
affairs, and the party itself dismissed the Committee’s
comments. The party’s constituency also preferred the
status quo (Oomen, Guijt, & Ploeg, 2010). It was there-
fore all the more surprising that a woman should run for
election for the SGP in 2013. She subsequently became
the first female SGP city council representative. What
happened, and how?
To answer this question, we conducted twelve in-
depth semi-structured interviews and content analysis
of media sources. Ten interviews were held with ac-
tive SGP members, including the female representative
herself, and two with experts on Dutch CEDAW com-
pliance. All interviews took place between January and
April 2014. The interviews were coded and analysed us-
ing ATLAS.ti. The content analysis is based on three dif-
ferentmedia sources, and provides additional contextual
understanding of the respondents’ statements and illus-
trates their experiences (for details on the selection of re-
spondents and the qualitative data, see Section C in the
Supplementary Material).
4. Quantitative Evidence
Detailed multi-level regression results are presented in
Section D in the Supplementary Material, Table 1. Here,
we discuss the main conclusions. Starting with the ques-
tion, how much variation in state compliance can be at-
tributed to within or across country variation, M1 shows
that actually 90% of the unexplained variance in state
compliance can be found across countries and only 10%
within countries over time. When adding control vari-
ables in M2, we can observe that 32.28% of the variance
in state compliance at the country level can be explained.
The main model is M3, which examines the associa-
tion between social norms and compliance including rel-
evant control variables. The variable that captures the
conservatism in social norms (that is, the extent to which
people agree that men are better political leaders) has a
coefficient of −0.19 (with a standard error of 0.05). This
is significantly different from 0 with p < 0.001. This neg-
ative association shows that the larger the share of a
population adhering to conservative norms, the lower
the compliance with the CEDAW.When adding the norm
variable, the explained variance at the country level in-
creases to 51.56%. A likelihood-ratio (LR) test indicates
that adding social norms as an explanatory variable sig-
nificantly improves the model’s explanatory power com-
pared to M2 (p < 0.01).
Finally, M4 adds a random slope for norms (“con-
servatism”) to see whether country differences exist in
the association between norms and compliance. The re-
sults show little to no difference in comparison to M3.
An LR test confirms that adding the random slope to
M3does not significantly improve the explanatory power
(p> 0.99). We can thus conclude that for our sample the
association between norms and compliance seems to be
consistent across countries.
In sum, our findings indicate that a population’s so-
cial norms are significantly related to state compliance
with Article 7A of the CEDAW, and that this effect is con-
sistent across countries.
Given the fact that the presented estimates might be
affected by influential cases (in this case countries), we
also apply a robustness check in which we rerun the ana-
lyses excluding those countries which have been identi-
fied as influential (based on Cook’s D, six countries have
been excluded: Argentina, Bulgaria, Peru, Rwanda, South
Africa, and Turkey). The results (see Table 2, Section D
in the Supplementary Material) do not substantially
change. The coefficient for norms (“conservatism”) re-
mains positive and significant and is slightly stronger
than in the model including the influential cases.
5. Qualitative Evidence
Though very important, such quantitative findings tell
us little about the processes that underlie the relation-
ship between social norms and state compliance. For this
purpose, we turn to the qualitative case study on the
Netherlands. The Dutch generally support women taking
up public functions; less than 20% agree that men are
better political leaders. This progressive context has de-
veloped gradually over the years.
In contrast to this widespread acceptance of gen-
der equality, there is one Dutch political party, the
SGP, that excluded women from political office until re-
cently. The party is the formal political organization of
the community of orthodox reformed Christians in the
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Netherlands. This group makes up about 10% of all re-
formed Christians, which measure about two-and-a-half
million people out of the total Dutch population of about
seventeenmillion (Oomenet al., 2010, p. 162). According
to the SGP community, a woman’s calling is not politics,
but taking care of her family. Many women in this com-
munity willingly disregard their voting and membership
rights, as they believe these are not in line with women’s
Biblical calling (Oomen et al., 2010, p. 169). Although
the SGP’s so-called “women’s stance” is not popular with
the rest of the Dutch society (Oomen et al., 2010), the
party has continually occupied two seats in the Dutch
parliament of 150 seats. Unexpectedly though, a woman,
Lilian Janse, became party leader of a local SGP branch in
2013 and was elected as SGP city council representative
in 2014. In the following section, we will apply the bar-
gaining approach of new institutionalism to investigate
whether this change can be explained by a bargaining
process over social norms concerning women in politics.
5.1. Conflict of Interest
A first precondition for a bargaining process on norms
to occur is the existence of a conflict of interest be-
tween two groups within a community over the chang-
ing of a dominant norm, in our case the SGP’s women’s
stance (Knight & Ensminger, 1998). For religious-based
ideological reasons, most SGP members did not want to
accept women into politics (Oomen et al., 2010). Most
of our interviewees argue that “we have a Bible which
clearly states that God, from the creation of mankind on-
wards, really distinguished [between men and women].
And that is very valuable” (Respondent 10). For many
years, this women’s stance was regarded as the status
quo within the SGP community.
The election of a female party leader in Vlissingen (a
small harbour city in the South-West) meant a sudden
break with the SGP community’s norm. Two particular
circumstances played a role. First, and most importantly,
the Vlissingen branch could not find a willing male party
leader for the elections, and were glad Lilian Janse was
willing to take up the responsibility. Second, the branch
was weakly represented in the council, and having a
female candidate in the more emancipated Vlissingen
was not likely to lead to a loss in votes—if anything,
they might be able to win more votes than in previous
rounds. Thismade a change in the branch’s perception of
the SGP’s norm; women’s political participation became
more desirable than maintaining the status quo.
One can thus argue that a conflict of interest
emerged within the SGP over its women’s stance. The
Vlissingen branch had interests in breaking with the old
norm, while the national majority wished to uphold the
traditional women’s stance. At the same time, it must
be emphasized that there was also considerable com-
mon ground between these seemingly opposed groups.
All strongly believe that the Bible proposes a natural or-
der, in which the man is seen as the leader of the fam-
ily, and the woman, the main care-taker. The Vlissingen
branch had no intention of changing that basic belief.
The only issue at stake was what this basic belief meant
for the role of women in politics. For the members in
Vlissingen, a woman could participate in politics after
finishing her main responsibilities in the family. In their
view, the Bible does not state that it is not allowed. On
the contrary, they felt the Bible clearly describes women
who did participate in politics, taking the biblical figures
such as the Queen of Sheba and Deborah as main exam-
ples (Respondent 4; Respondent 7).
5.2. Asymmetry in Resources
The second precondition for a bargaining process and
possible change of norms is an asymmetry in bargain-
ing resources between the two groups. An important re-
source is access to and control over norm enforcement
methods. Informal methods of enforcement within a
community concern rewards or social disapproval and os-
tracism (Knight & Ensminger, 1998, p. 106). Formal meth-
ods of enforcement include access to or control over of-
ficial bodies, and most notably, initiation of court cases.
Within the SGP community, strong informal disap-
proval on thewomen’s stance seems to have been largely
absent. Also those who did disagree with the women’s
stance had little intention of changing it, considering
party and community unity more important. In this re-
spect, it seems that the Vlissingen branch had very
little informal bargaining power. A very different pic-
ture emerges, however, if one takes into account the
way the rest of Dutch society frowned upon the SGP’s
women’s stance. All the interviewed respondents speak
of strong social disapproval against the SGP community
by a majority of the Dutch population because of its
women’s stance. This disapproval is experienced on a reg-
ular basis:
If I tell them that I am on the candidates’ list for
the SGP, they compare you to the Taliban, who con-
siders women to be less worthy than dogs. They do
not give you a chance to really explain your position.
(Respondent 10)
Most respondents consider such informal disapproval as
condemnatory, and feel their norms clash with the rest
of the Dutch society. Our media analysis confirms these
experiences. Especially articles from the main left-wing
newspaper tend to ridicule the SGP and its women’s
stance: “It’s about a backward political party, we don’t
have to argue about that anymore” (Abraham, 2003).
This conflict between the SGP and the large majority
of the Dutch increased the bargaining power of the
Vlissingen branchwhenproposing a newnormofwomen
being electable, by supporting the candidacy of a first-
ever female party leader.
Informal bargaining power is only part of the story,
however. Access to, or control over formal enforcement
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mechanisms can also be influential in the bargaining pro-
cess. For those wanting to change the SGP’s women’s
stance, these were plenty. Dutch law made it possible to
sue the party, if only one SGPwomanwaswilling to do so.
And yet, no SGP member did—not even the Vlissingen
branch. The women’s stance was part of the official regu-
lations of the party, and no one wanted to change these
via the court (Oomen et al., 2010).
Again, as with the informal method of enforcement,
formal enforcement came from outside the SGP. In 2003,
a group of Dutch NGOs sued the Dutch State for vi-
olating women’s rights. This immediately put a great
deal of pressure on the SGP community: “I even consid-
ered this to be threatening now and then. Apparently,
we are no longer granted any space…in the democratic
Netherlands” (Respondent 11). The community—even
those who did not necessarily support the women’s
stance—was determined to fight for maintaining their
rules and norms. Notwithstanding this, after almost ten
years of court cases and appeals, the Dutch High Court
ruled in 2010 that the Dutch State was indeed in viola-
tion of Article 7 of the CEDAW. As a consequence, the
Dutch State became obliged to take measures to ensure
women’s political participationwithin the SGP. An appeal
by the SGP to the European Court for Human Rights was
dismissed in 2012. The Dutch state, reluctant to interfere,
gave the SGP six months to come up with their own solu-
tion (Vroegindeweij, 2012).
In March 2013, the SGP formally changed its
women’s stance. This, however, did not cause a norm
change within the SGP community. The party changed
its statutes, so women could no longer be formally re-
fused, but it kept an informal manifest that signified that
women’s political participation is against their calling
(SGP, 2013). In addition, the local SGP branches were not
required to change their statutes accordingly, as these
are largely independent from the national party.
Nevertheless, the grounds for maintaining the status
quo were weakening. Both the informal pressure from
the Dutch population at large, and the court cases insti-
gated by the Dutch NGOs had an impact in shifting the
bargaining resources (i.e., power) from the proponents
of thewomen’s stance to themore progressivemembers
of the SGP community, like the Vlissingen branch.
5.3. Enforcement
The final step needed in order to understand the bar-
gaining process is an appreciation of the role of norm
enforcement.When the Vlissingen branch announced its
election of Janse as their party leader, the SGP commu-
nity could no longer use formal methods to block this.
Informal disapproval, however, was immediately exer-
cised. The Vlissingen branch received numerous phone
calls, e-mails, and letters of disapproval (Respondent 7).
These came from other local branches and conservative
individual members. Most were polite requests for Janse
to step down, as her role was not in line with a woman’s
calling (Lilian Janse, interview). The national SGP board
visited the Vlissingen branch, to ask whether they would
be willing to reconsider. The Vlissingen SGP members
felt confident in defending their position, and empha-
sized the new formal rules: “I told them of course not!
Everything happened legally, according to our regula-
tions” (Respondent 7).
Janse’s appointment as party leader met with
strong social approval from outside the SGP commu-
nity. Interviewed members of the Vlissingen branch re-
port that people congratulated Janse on the streets, or
promised her their support in the elections:
People approach me [and say]: ‘Great that a woman
is going to do it!’ It is more about me being a woman
of course. I get all kinds of positive comments about
that. Outside the SGP community, actually only posi-
tive ones.” (Lilian Janse, interview)
This external support made Janse feel that she was
given “the status of heroine” (Lilian Janse, interview).
Moreover, the approval was translated in votes during
the city council elections, and resulted in the first politi-
cal seat ever held by an SGP woman.
In summary, two elements seem to have jointly re-
sulted in Janse winning her seat in the city council elec-
tions. First, the changing of the SGP’s formal statutes,
which happened after the Dutch authorities had lost the
court cases initiated by the NGOs. This reinforced the
second element, which was the strong informal enforce-
ment. This informal enforcement came fromwidespread
and strong support from the progressive Dutch major-
ity. The media also reported on Janse very positively and
the analysed newspaper articles seem to show a gener-
ally positive attitude towards her election. Second, there
was also some support by the less conservativemembers
within the SGP community.
Based on these qualitative findings, we argue that it
was indeed a bargaining process over social norms that
led to an increase in compliance. The conflict of interest
within the SGP community over the women’s stance was
won by those in favour of changing it, due to their su-
perior bargaining power. It is nevertheless too early to
judge whether the norm change will be sustained. Even
when somemembers of a community are convinced that
a norm change is necessary, only continued informal sup-
port can guarantee long-term change. When such sup-
port is absent or insufficient, it remains likely that people
will revert to honoring the old norm (Nee& Ingram, 1998,
p. 120). Only time will tell whether the norm change
within the SGP can be sustained. Until then, our results
only allow us to claim to have described the start of a
possible norm change.
6. Conclusion
This study seeks to provide empirical evidence concern-
ing the relationship between social norms and compli-
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ance with human rights treaties. Our quantitative find-
ings show support for the proposition that social norms
are positively associated with compliance to Article 7A
of the CEDAW. The larger the adherence to conservative
norms on women’s political participation, the lower the
state compliance with Article 7A of the CEDAW. This rela-
tionship between norms and compliance appears to be
constant across countries.
Our complementary qualitative case study provides
evidence that bargaining over social norms is one of the
processes underlying the observed quantitative relation-
ship. In this process, superiority in bargaining resources
is essential. If the group with the most resources favours
change towards less restrictive norms (i.e., the possibil-
ity of women’s political engagement outside the house-
hold) then the resulting bargaining will lead to an in-
crease in compliancewith CEDAW’s requirements regard-
ing women’s participation in politics. This study shows
that such bargaining superiority is not only related to
the community concerned, but can also be facilitated
by groups outside the community. With outside sup-
port, even a minority within a community may win the
bargaining process. This finding might be interesting for
those who aim to implement human rights treaties in
local communities that at first sight appear opposed to
these treaties.
Our empirical findings suggest that social norms
should be added to the explanatory factors of state com-
pliance with human rights treaties. As such, our study
confirms the propositions of previous studies that social
norms can help explain the wide variation in compliance
we see in practice (Cortell & Davis, 2000; Fraser, 2019;
Harris-Short, 2003; Zwart, 2012; Zwingel, 2012). They ar-
gue that compliance can be obstructed by populations
when the content of a treaty does not match their social
norms. On the other hand, populations can also support
compliance when their norms match the content. Our
study not only shows that such a relationship exists; it
also explains why.
Even though the mixed-methods design provides a
more thorough picture of the research subject than
would have been possible by using only one method,
time and space constraints do not allow us to use each
method’s potential to the fullest. A more elaborate qual-
itative study could lead to more detailed insights. For in-
stance, this study sheds little light on the Dutch govern-
ment’s reluctance to interfere with SGP party matters,
which might be related to a long tradition of protect-
ing religious freedom. Finally, the qualitative part of this
study increases the credibility that a causal relationship
might exist between social norms and state compliance,
as it identifies a process that underlies this relationship.
Nonetheless, the relation might also work the other way
around. The presence of women in politics could serve
as an example, with the informal support of having more
women in politics as a consequence.
This study establishes a first step towards a better
understanding of the role of social norms in compliance
with human rights. Challenges for future research lie in
confirming, falsifying, and expanding the current results.
Special attention could be paid to whether the bargain-
ing process is also prevalent in other contexts, or why
it might not be. The Netherlands is a typical example
of a country with high compliance and a small share of
conservatives. Additional typical cases, such as countries
with low compliance and a large share of conservative
people, could be researched.
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